In the last 12 to 18 months, beauty’s biggest strategics have been buying and selling at the same time, and the pattern is too consistent to be a coincidence. Unilever bought Wild and then Dr. Squatch, the latter for $1.5 billion, then sold Kate Somerville. Ulta Beauty acquired Space NK for a reported £300 million-plus (over $401 million). L’Oréal bought Medik8 and Color Wow, then sold Carol’s Daughter back to its founder, alongside its roughly €4 billion purchase of Kering Beauté. Henkel agreed to pay $1.4 billion for Olaplex. And WHP Global, with G-III Apparel Group, closed its purchase of Marc Jacobs from LVMH inside a 50/50 joint venture.
Taken together, these events suggest a deliberate pattern rather than a series of coincidences. The same groups sit on both sides of the trade. “A group that is only selling is deleveraging under pressure. A group doing both is reallocating,” Greg Elgunov, Managing Director at Solon Corporate Finance, told BeautyMatter. When several strategics do it together against the same rate environment, that’s a cycle. The numbers bear it out. Strategic buyer activity in beauty rose 22.9% year over year to 43 deals through 2025, while private equity’s direct investments fell 55.6% to 8, according to Capstone Partners.
M&A multiples in the sector have averaged 14.9x EV/EBITDA year till date 2026, compared with roughly 9.8x in the broader consumer industry. “It is a genuine cycle. It is not a coordinated one, and those are two different things,” J. Patrick Galleher, Managing Partner at Boxwood Partners, told BeautyMatter. “Nobody in Dusseldorf called anybody in Paris.”
Every adviser interviewed pointed to the same trigger: the cost of capital. According to Galleher, brand deals underwritten between 2018 and 2022 assumed a demand curve and discount rate that no longer exists. When he spoke to BeautyMatter, Greg Elgunov, Managing Director at Solon Corporate Finance, bluntly explained the arithmetic. “When the risk-free rate moves several hundred basis points, every acquisition case built on the old rate fails its own test simultaneously. You don’t need a coordinating mechanism for that. You need an arithmetic one, and a rate reset is exactly that.”
A second, quieter force is the refinancing wall, however. A large share of the debt raised in 2020 and 2021 falls due in this window. “A refinancing is a forcing event,” said Elgunov. According to him, boards that could defer a portfolio decision indefinitely suddenly face lenders with a leverage ratio that looks materially worse than it did when the facility was struck. Galleher added that the Federal Reserve’s 150 basis points of cuts since September 2024 reopened financing, although it is important to note that the Federal Reserve raised rates 25 basis points in September 2026. “Deals shelved since 2022 got launched in late 2024 and 2025, landing inside the same window.”
Evan Merali, Managing Director for Consumer & Retail at Raymond James, framed it as a growth problem more than a rate story. “Over the last couple of years, growth has been much harder to come by,” he said to BeautyMatter, adding that many strategics underperformed either because of an overly complex, hard-to-manage portfolio, or a focus on low-growth categories.
Activism, where it shows up, is downstream, not causal. “Activists arrive once the gap between the sum of the parts and the market capitalization is already visible on a screen,” said Elgunov. “They accelerate a decision the arithmetic had already made.” As Galleher explained, “the macro sets the window. The individual owner decides whether to step through it. When the window is open, everybody looks coordinated.”
Olaplex is the cleanest test of how differently public markets and strategics now price a hero-product beauty brand. Henkel’s $2.06-a-share offer, a 55% premium to the pre-announcement price, values the company at $1.4 billion against fiscal 2025 net sales of $423 million. “Anyone reading the headline as ‘strategics will not pay up for hero brands’ is reading it backward,” Galleher said. “Roughly 80% of the value destruction is the earnings base, not the rating.”
Elgunov reached the same conclusion from the financing side. “The two numbers answer two different questions, so the gap between them is less mysterious than it first looks,” he said, adding that a takeover premium simply reflects what it costs to get a board to recommend and a register to tender, not what the buyer thinks the asset is worth. The real signal, he argued, is that “public markets have repriced concentration risk. In 2021 a single hero product was a virtue. Today, it’s a discount factor.”
Merali sees the same brand differently. “Olaplex is fundamentally a good company. It’s an amazing brand with great products and a large international footprint,” he said. He also added that Henkel’s move signals belief that it can flourish as part of a larger platform. Beth Johnson, Associate at Focus Investment Banking, framed the lesson for founders. “Core fundamentals must prevail. [Think] revenue durability, promotional quality, strong margins, differentiated products, repeat purchasing behavior. There needs to be evidence of a brand's longevity,” she said.
The buyer pool has split three ways: strategics, a retreating private equity, and a new class of brand-licensing platforms. “Sponsors did not leave the category,” Galleher said. “It lost the auction math.” At roughly fifteen times entry, a sponsor needs leverage that a beauty brand’s growth cannot support. Meanwhile, a strategic bidding off its own balance sheet, with no obligation to exit, wins the bid without necessarily paying more.
The financing structure confirms it. Ulta Beauty funded SpaceNK with cash and existing credit capacity; L’Oréal paid its Kering Beauté bill in cash; and Henkel is funding Olaplex from its own balance sheet. “The cheque is the tell,” said Galleher. “A CEO who has to syndicate risk is telling you the deal could hurt. A CEO writing a revolver draw is telling you it cannot.”
The exception is licensing platforms like WHP Global, financed partly through committed debt from Morgan Stanley Senior Funding. Elgunov explained why lenders back that structure when they won’t touch the operating business. “The trademark is the collateral ... a contracted minimum guarantee behaves far more like a bond coupon than a beauty profit and loss account does.” His sharper read is that “when a licensing platform wins the process, the strategics have looked and passed.”
What comes next is not a straight line, Galleher argued. Color cosmetics, celebrity-partnered brands, and 2018-to-2021-vintage sponsor-owned labels look most over-owned today. Yet the same window that has also produced Kimberly-Clark's proposed $48.7 billion acquisition of Kenvue, approved by both companies' shareholders in January 2026, is a textbook example of re-consolidation around retail leverage, media buying power, and supply chain scale. “A conglomerate can do both in the same quarter without contradicting itself,” Galleher said. “Consolidate where scale pays, fragment where scale hurts,” he added. For beauty’s dealmakers, that tension is the story to watch through 2026.